Product Description
A decade after the 1971 wars in South Asia, the principal decisionmakers were still uncertain why wars so clearly unwanted had occurred. The authors reconstruct the complex decisionmaking process attending the break-up of Pakistan and the subsequent war between India and Pakistan. Much of their data derive from interviews conducted with principal players in each of the countries immediately involved-Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh-including Indira Gandhi and leaders of the Awami League in Bangladesh.
Buy This book from Amazon Now! Shipping in Pakistan & Round the world available Click War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh to buy now.
Sisson and Rose present a thorough analysis of the policy decisions of the involved governments that led to the creation of Bangladesh as an independent country. The authors describe the issues and events that faced the leaders of the respective governments and their actions. Of note, the book does not describe the events that occurred to the people of Bangaldesh during the war.
Rating: 4 / 5
Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose put all of their many interviews to good use in War and Secession (Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh). They present all sides of the various complex relationships of this region, as well as presenting the fascinating international views of the situation, predominantly China, USSR, and the US. They are careful to remain unbiased (perhaps sometimes a little too unbiased in the case of Bhutto, in my opinion) and present the misperceptions that all sides were using to base their decisions upon. This book will also be a joy for the general reader as they make all the issues understandable and unravel all the tangles between the various personalities. The authors provide a defintive account of the creation of Bangladesh that will both entertain and inform.
Rating: 4 / 5
Sisson and Rose present a highly informative account of the events leading to the independence of Bangladesh. As a Pakistani, it proved depressing reading as one sees how events unfolded in what would almost be a comedy of errors had the human cost not been so high. The actions of key protaganists leave one disgusted at their short-sightedness and venality. Much as we may like to think that it was ‘all India’s fault’, the authors make it quite clear that while India acted to take full opportunity of the chances it had, its role in precipitating the Crisis was negligible (if at all). Similarly, while Yahya Khan and the Army must take the blame for the ultimate decision of the Army action, the behaviour of the prominent Pakistani political leaders, especially Bhutto (who, from the events narrated in the book, seems to come away with the most blame), beggars belief. A must read for anyone interested in the events of 1971 free of the baggage that subcontinental writers bring to the subject.
Rating: 5 / 5
The authors provide a well-balanced, unbiased historical account of the accounts leading to the war of 1971. The book is very well researched with numerous notes on various sources of information.
The book describes the genesis of the problems in East Pakistan, beginning with the partition of India and the formation of Pakistan’s two wings. Carefully collected economic data demonstrates the lop-sided distribution of wealth in Pakistan with more government spending and foreign aid going to the West than to the East, despite the latter having a greater population and suffering from severe natural disasters. Also cited are the differences between East and West Pakistan over confronting India over Kashmir. The East did not share a penchant for confronting India over Kashmir – a territory that lay over a 1000 miles away. There were more pressing problems at home then (circumstances that are eerily similar to those today in Pakistan!).
These differences came to a height in a war fought over Kashmir in 1965 (instigated upon Bhutto’s advice to Ayub Khan) when East Pakistan was left virtually undefended against any potential Indian military advances. This further contributed to its sense of insecurity.
The politicians of West Pakistan, most notably Z. A. Bhutto and Yahya Khan, are blamed unambiguously for their role in canceling a session of the first democratically elected national assembly in Pakistan that precipitated in a crisis in March 1971. India’s role in contributing to the crisis until March 1971 was minimal, if any, but was to assume greater importance in the months to follow. The failure of all political processes to placate the demands of Z. A. Bhutto led to the suspension of the National Assembly, and subsequent events.
However, once the crisis resulted in millions of refugees flowing into India that threatened to upset the delicate demographic balance in the affected states, the problem also became one of India’s. The authors fault Indira Gandhi for not trying harder to achieve a political settlement of the problem. It is highly unlikely that India could have mediated a problem between West and East Pakistan. After Indira Gandhi concluded that the problem could not be resolved politically by Pakistan’s leaders, India began to play an increasingly larger political-military role, beginning in the summer of 1971 and concluding with a lightning military campaign in December, 1971.
Rating: 5 / 5